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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND 
DOMESTIC LAW: A VIEW FROM ALBANIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
Fisnik Korenica and Dren Doli* 
ABSTRACT 
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between 
treaties and the domestic legal order of Albania.  At the outset, 
the article specifically questions the treaty-making and 
ratification powers under the auspices of Albanian 
constitutional law.  The article then models the relationship 
between treaties and the Albanian domestic legal order, 
arguing that international treaties form part of the national 
legal order and are incorporated and directly applied in the 
domestic context, most of the time prevailing over inconsistent 
laws.  The question of domestic constitutional review of 
international treaties and the mechanisms in place to ensure 
the prevalence of treaties over inconsistent domestic laws is 
also addressed.  The article discusses the pacta sunt servanda 
principle and the bonna fidei application of international 
treaties within the Albanian Constitution.  Finally, the article 
clarifies the relationship between international treaties and 
the domestic Albanian legal order, suggesting that 
constitutional justice must make use of these findings in order 
to sharpen the relationship concerned.  This article thus 
affirms the congruous relationship between international 
treaties and the Albanian domestic legal order.   
                                                          
 
*Fisnik Korenica is a Lecturer on the Theory of State and Law at the 
University of Prishtina and a Senior Research Fellow at the Group for Legal 
and Political Studies. Dren Doli is a Senior Research Fellow at the Group for 
Legal and Political Studies and a Senior Lecturer on Law Principles at 
Universum University College, having served earlier as a Senior Legal 
Executive for Integration to the Kosovo Prime Minister. The article is written 
as part of the Assessing Democracy in the Western Balkans research project of 
the Group for Legal and Political Studies. The authors thank the Research 
Committee of the Group for Legal and Political Studies for providing in-depth 
comments and recommendations on the first draft. 
1
  
2012]            ALBANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 
INTRODUCTION: LOCATING THE QUESTION 
The relationship between international law and national 
law has plagued the legal world from ancient times.  One could 
argue that, though an old problem, the relationship retains 
relevance in the contemporary world.  In light of the growing 
impact of international law on both domestic and international 
affairs, the search for an understanding of the relationship 
between international and national legal systems becomes 
essential in order to address many legal and political questions.  
As such, the latter serves as a basic point of reference for this 
article. 
While many lawyers promote the importance of 
international law, they distinguish between domestic and 
international law, holding that the two systems have different 
targets and intentions. This attitude contributes to the view 
that international and domestic laws are independent legal 
systems that do not overlap.  In contrast, the vast majority of 
lawyers around the world contend that international and 
domestic law, though differing on occasion, coincide in almost 
every aspect.1  The latter view, as a result, has raised the 
question of the communication and rapport between the two 
legal orders.  Thus, one can argue that due to the imperative 
points that assemble them, the relationship between 
international law and national law should be regulated, 
resolving most of the questions that arise regarding the 
dominance of one over the other.  In this context, the modern 
drafters of constitutions face two main questions: whether 
international law must be incorporated into domestic law and, 
if incorporated, how to rank it within the domestic legal order.2 
                                                          
 1 E.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); J. G. Starke, 
Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT.Y.B. INT’L 
L. 66 (1936). See alsoMALCOLM M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2008); 
Edwin Borchard, The Relation between International Law and Municipal 
Law, 27 VA. L. REV. 137 (1940); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or 
Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 
(1963). 
2 See Antonio La Pergola, The Relationship Between International and 
Domestic Law: Traditional Problems and New Trends, in European Comm’n 
for Democracy Through Law, The Relationship Between International and 
Domestic Law, Doc. No. CDL-STD(1993)005 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Eur. 
Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, International and Domestic Law]. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
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In principle, most scholars agree that the relationship 
between treaties and domestic law is regulated by specific 
constitutional rules.3  There are those, however, who argue 
that international legal precepts should always take 
precedence in regards to the regulation of the relationship 
between the two orders.4  In general, the question revolves 
around two issues: whether international law and domestic law 
should be part of a single system of law or whether 
international law and domestic law should be independent of 
one another.  HanzKelsen, for instance, has argued that they 
must be part of a single legal order, with international law 
prevailing over domestic.5 
In the monistic doctrine, international law and national 
law always come together to form a single legal system.6  In 
monist models, a ratified international treaty forms part of the 
domestic legal order and is directly incorporated and often 
directly applied at the national level.7  Dualism, by contrast, 
views international and domestic law as two independent legal 
orders. Dualist models of the relationship between inter-
national law and domestic law propose that a treaty takes 
effect internationally after being signed by the head of state, 
but in order for it to have sway over domestic legal affairs, the 
treaty’s text must be adopted through a law of parliament.8  
Though the debate between monist and dualist theories offers 
                                                          
3 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S  MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 68–70 (7th ed. 1997); see also Antonio Cassese, Modern 
Constitutions and International Law, 192 RECUEIL DES COURS [COLLECTED 
COURSES] 331, 370–73 (1985).  
4 A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International 
Law: Monist Versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309, 311 (2001) 
(arguing that the regulation of relationship between international and 
domestic law must rest with the former). 
5 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg 
trans., 1945).  
6 See generally MALANCZUK, supra note 3; SHAW, supra note 1. 
7 SeeTIM HILLIER, SOURCEBOOK ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 
1998). See also SHAW, supra note 1, Francois Rigaux, Hans Kelsen on 
International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325 (1998). 
8 E.g., R. Balkin, International Law and Domestic Law, in PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 119 (Sam Blay et. al eds., 
1997); MALANCZUK, supra note 3, at 45; Gib van Ert, Dubious Dualism: The 
Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 927 (2010). 
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no permanent solutions,9 it presents the groundwork for a 
logical investigation of the often fraught relationship of the 
theories.  Hence, though not aimed at using monism and 
dualism unreservedly, one would at least apply these models in 
our case to the extent logical.  
The goal of this article is to explore and discuss the 
relationship between international treaties and domestic law in 
Albania.  The article will begin by discussing constitutional 
law. Other international legal issues will be explored later.  In 
general, the article will consider four topics: first, the treaty-
making powers and the ratification procedure of Albanian 
constitutional law; second, the relationship between 
international treaties and domestic law, analyzing the model of 
employment and model of incorporation, the question of direct 
applicability, and the rank of incorporated treaties within the 
domestic legal order; third, the issue of the constitutional 
review of treaties, including the review of the consistency 
between laws and treaties; and fourth, the question of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.  By evaluating both scholastic 
and technical arguments from literature and the law, 
particularly that of constitutional justice, the article will 
attempt to answer the questions posed through an 
investigation of the relationship between international treaties 
and domestic law in Albania.  In this respect, the article argues 
that Albanian constitutional law and international law enjoy 
an agreeable relationship.  
First, however, we need to clarify the term “treaty” and 
explain its position within the broader context of public 
international law.  For the purposes of this article, the term 
“treaty” refers to a written agreement between two or more 
statesentered into based on public international law.10  The 
term treaty refers to everything in opposition to customary 
international law.  As a result, this article addresses the 
relationship between international treaties and Albanian 
domestic law, ignoring customary international law. 
                                                          
9 Carl AageNørgaard, The Implementation of International Human 
Rights’ Agreements within a Domestic Legal System, in Eur. Comm’n. for 
Democracy Through Law, International and Domestic Law, supra note 2. 
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
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Also, digging deeper into the question of treaty-making 
powers and ratification procedures in the case of Albania 
directs us to two essential authorities that regulate the issue: 
the Constitution of Albania and the Law on the Making of 
International Treaties and Agreements of Albania (“LMITAA”).  
It is worth noting that these documents, and related 
controversies arising from the discrepancies between them, 
stem from the fact that LMITAAwas adopted under the 
previous Albanian constitutional regime.  The new 
Constitution of Albania, promulgated in 1998, however, has 
recognized LMITAA’s legal effect.  
TREATY-MAKING AND RATIFICATION UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF ALBANIA 
In monist legal systems, as in Albania’s, the act of treaty 
ratification produces two effects in theory: 1) it makes the 
polity internationally responsible for respecting and applying 
ratified treaties, and 2) it makes the polity domestically 
responsible for applying the obligations from any signed 
treaties.11  In contrast, in dualist legal systems, as in the 
United Kingdom, the obligations of a treaty only become 
domestically applicable after being adopted by the House of 
Commons in the form of a law.12  Having explained the 
difference between how these two systems work, we can now 
discuss treaty making powers and procedures.  
In the first case in point, the Constitution of Albania 
states:  
The ratification and denunciation of international agreements by 
the Republic of Albania is done by law if they have to do with: a) 
territory, peace, alliances, political and military issues; b) 
freedoms, human rights and obligations of citizens as are 
provided in the Constitution; c) membership of the Republic of 
Albania in international organizations; d) the undertaking of 
financial obligations by the Republic of Albania; e) the approval, 
amendment, supplementing or repeal of laws. The Assembly 
may, with a majority of all its members, ratify other 
international agreements that are not contemplated in 
                                                          
11 E.g., MALANCZUK, supra note 3, at 130–147.   
12 Id. at 126. 
5
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paragraph 1 of this article.13 
Based upon this provision, three arguments can be made.  
First, international agreements concerning the fields of 
territory, peace, alliances, political and military issues, human 
rights and freedoms, membership in international 
organizations, financial obligations, and treaties changing 
domestic laws should be ratified by the Albanian Parliament.14  
In other words, any treaties pertaining to these areas cannot be 
legally binding without first going through a parliamentary 
ratification procedure.  That is, the Albanian Parliament is 
vested with the power to provide the instrument of ratification 
in the aforementioned fields, with ratification acting as the 
main instrument of international law.15  Second, in addition to 
having the right to ratify treaties, the Albanian Parliament has 
the right to denounce them as well.  Hence, only the 
Parliament can denounce an international treaty concerning 
one or more of these areas.  Third, as prescribed by the 
Constitution, the instrument of ratification provided by the 
Parliament in these fields is produced by law.  In this regard, 
the ratification procedure according to the Albanian 
Constitution can be attained only through an enacted law.  The 
                                                          
13 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 121(1)–(2). 
14 See Eur. Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative 
Study of National Solutions to the Question of the Relationship Between 
International and Domestic Law and Recommendations Relating Thereto: 
Slovak Republic, Doc. No. CDL(1993)052e-restr (Nov. 9, 1993) [hereinafter 
Eur. Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative Study] (noting, 
some constitutions, such as that of Slovakia, give the power of ratification of 
treaties to the President of  the Republic. In order for the President of the 
Republic to ratify an international agreement, however, the President must 
first get the consent of the parliament). 
15 See Eur. Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative 
Study of National Solutions to the Question of the Relationship Between 
International and Domestic Law and Recommendations Relating Thereto, 
Doc. No. CDL(1993)024e-restr (May 19, 1993) (by Constantin P. Economides) 
(noting that the Albanian Parliament is vested with the power to ratify 
treaties falling in the fields concerned. Ratification, as opposed to 
parliamentary approval, is an instrument of international law and signifies 
that the country has taken the international obligation over the ratified 
treaty. Some states vest the head of state or government with ratification 
powers, but prior to ratifying a treaty, the head of state or government must 
get the approval of the Parliament. In this case, the act of approval is a 
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law of ratification is issued in a regular law-making procedure, 
as provided for by the Constitution of Albania.  In sum, 
ratifying treaties in these specified areas rests with the 
Albanian Parliament; ratification confers on the Parliament 
the right to make or refuse internationally binding obligations.  
Albania’s Constitution, as seen in Article 121, also gives 
the Parliament the right to ratify treaties that do not fall in the 
areas mentioned in the provision.16  As a result, the Parliament 
is vested with the power to prohibit the President and/or the 
government from ratifying a treaty falling outside the 
concerned areas, unless the Parliament itself gives 
authorization.  Article 121, thus, has the effect of giving the 
Parliament discretionary power over the President and/or 
government by affirming a treaty’s provisions solely through 
the act of signing.  This result leaves questions unanswered: 
how does a treaty falling outside the parameters laid out in the 
provision become ratified?  According to the Constitution of 
Albania, who has the authority to negotiate and formulate 
treaties?  Of course, treaty-making refers only to the act of 
negotiating and formulating a treaty, not to the act of 
ratification.  So, who holds treaty-making powers and 
procedures in Albanian domestic law?  
From a constitutional perspective, treaty-making power is 
linked to the prerogative of signing a treaty.  The Albanian 
Constitution establishes two different and possibly 
contradictory situations with regard to the power to sign 
treaties on behalf of the Republic of Albania.  On the one hand, 
while laying out the powers of the President, Article 92 of the 
Constitution establishes that the President “signs international 
agreements according to the law.”17 On the other hand, Article 
121(3) of the Constitution states: “[t]he Prime Minister notifies 
the Assembly whenever the Council of Ministers signs an 
international agreement that is not ratified by law.”18  There 
seems to be an overt conflict between these provisions 
pertaining to treaty-making powers as far as the signing of 
treaties is concerned.  To this extent, the Constitution 
                                                          
16 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 121. 
17 Id. art.92(h). 
18 Id. art.121(3). 
7
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references two authorities that “sign treaties,”19 adding that it 
does not demarcate the border of competence between the two. 
Article 92 designates the President as the authority who signs 
international treaties. Article 121(3), however, seems to 
endorse the Council of Ministers as the body authorized to sign 
treaties, albeit passively.   
Let us now observe the problem from the perspective of the 
LMITAA. LMITAA, which was issued by the former 
constitutional regime of Albania, contains numerous provisions 
that conflict with one another.20 Yet, its legal force is 
recognized by the current Constitution.21 For one thing, 
LMITAA draws a distinction between the signing power of the 
President of the Republic and that of the Council of Ministers.  
As opposed to the current constitution, LMITAA states that if 
Albania itself is subject to a treaty, then the right to negotiate 
and sign it rests solely with the President.22  On the other 
hand, if the government is subject to a treaty, then the 
President of the Council of Ministers retains that right.23  In 
either case, the foreign minister counter-signs on any treaty.24  
As a result, one can argue that Article 4 of LMITAA 
complicates many issues. It conflicts with the current 
Constitution.  
In the first case, the division between the President of the 
Republic and the Council of Ministers, with regard to the right 
to negotiate and sign treaties, is far from being demarcated by 
                                                          
19 The same overt situation appears in the Constitution of Croatia also. 
The latter, in Article 139, establishes that: “[i]nternational agreements which 
are not subject of ratification by the Croatian Parliament are concluded by 
the President of the Republic at the proposal of the Government, or by the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia.” USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE 
[CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA] Apr. 2, 2001, art. 139. Therefore, 
the Croatian Constitution does not demarcate the border of power between 
the government and President of Republic as far as the signing of treaties 
that need no parliamentarian ratification is concerned.ANTHONY MOORE, 
POLICE AND JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIDE 2004 
NATIONAL REPORTS 28 (Anthony Moore ed., 2004).  
20 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF 
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 4.   
21 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.178(1). 
22 LMITAA art. 4.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.   
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
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LMITAA.  LMITAA attempts to increate a distinction between 
treaties in which the subject is the Republic of Albania and 
treaties in which the subject is the government of Albania.25  
The problems here seem obvious.  One issue is how the Rep-
ublic of Albania, in its legal terminology, encompasses the 
government of Albania.  LMITAA, both logically and legally, 
cannot demarcate the signing of treaties power of the President 
of Republic, on the one hand, and the Council of Ministers, on 
the other.  An attempt to do so results in an awkward and 
naïve solution.  
Although LMITAA offers only confusion in this regard, the 
Albanian Constitutional Court has ruled at least once on this 
issue and, therefore, has paved the way for some clarification.  
In Socialist Party v. Council of Ministers, the Albanian 
Constitutional Court ruled that a treaty could not be 
negotiated and signed unless the President of the Republic has 
provided authorization on negotiating and signing it.26  In fact, 
the Court ruled that doing so was unconstitutional.27  Further, 
the Court argued that the lack of presidential authorization 
contradicts the Constitution and LMITAA as well as that the 
power to negotiate and sign treaties does not only derive from 
Article 92 of the Constitution, but from LMITAA.28  By turning 
to the President’s duty to represent the unity of the people, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that in order for a treaty to be 
constitutionally binding, it must be negotiated and signed on 
the authorization of the President of the Republic.29  The Court 
reasoned that Article 92 gave the President the right to sign 
treaties and disregarded Article 121, which conferred this 
power to the Council of Ministers.30 
In light of Socialist Party case, one could argue that the 
case was settled.31  In the end, the power to negotiate treaties 
                                                          
25 Id. 
26.Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Apr. 15, 2010, 52 
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1875. 
27 Id. 
28 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 92. 
29 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Apr. 15, 2010, 52 
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and to sign them rested with the President of the Republic.32 
Additionally, should the Council of Ministers wish to negotiate 
and ratify treaties, it must first obtain presidential 
authorization or confirmation to proceed.33  We cannot go so 
far, however, as to argue that LMITAA’s insistence on having 
every treaty counter-signed by the foreign minister is 
unconstitutional.  This statement would rest on the idea that 
the power to sign a treaty, as provided by the Constitution, 
cannot be shared with and constrained by the foreign minister, 
which would leave Article 4 of LMITAA itself utterly 
unconstitutional and, thus, in conflict with the ruling of the 
Albanian Constitutional Court.  While the power to make and 
sign treaties rests with the President of the Republic and the 
Council of Ministers, the Foreign Minister still plays an 
important role in facilitating the process of treaty-making.34 
But what happens once a treaty is negotiated and signed?  
In light of the Albanian Constitution, LMITAA, and the case 
law of the Albanian Constitutional Court, we argue that after a 
treaty is signed, it then goes to the Parliament for ratification 
as long as it falls within the fields prescribed in Article 121.  If 
the treaty does not fall within the fields prescribed in Article 
121, this provision and the Parliament does not require that it 
be ratified; it is ipso iure, ratified when signed by the President 
of Republic.  
The Constitution also explores the question of whether 
local governmental institutions have the right to enter into 
international treaties.  Article 109(4) states: 
The organs of local government units have the right to form 
unions and joint institutions with one another for the 
representation of their interests, to cooperate with local units of 
other countries, and also to be represented in international 
organizations of local powers.35 
In this respect, Article 109(4) seems to imply that local 
government institutions have the constitutional right to join 
with other international organizations whose field of work is 
                                                          
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 THE LAW ON FOREIGN SERVICE OF ALBANIA [LFSA] art.16(d). 
35 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.109(4). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
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local governance.  While the question of whether the local 
governments can be a party to an international treaty remains 
unresolved in Article 109(4), LMITAA addresses this issue 
head-on by claiming that local governments may be party to a 
treaty that falls within the field of local governance,36 provided 
that the Foreign Ministry has given its assent.37  Still, LMITAA 
does not clarify whether the local government can actually sign 
the treaty.  In light of the Constitution and LMITAA, therefore, 
one could argue that although local governments are given the 
capacity to be parties to international treaties, any treaty 
should still be signed and ratified by central institutions once 
the local governments have finished negotiating it.38 
The issue of the publication of treaties in the domestic 
context is also important in light of legal certainty.  Article 
117(3) of the Albanian Constitution establishes that 
“[i]nternational agreements that are ratified by law are 
promulgated and published according to the procedures that 
are provided for laws.  The promulgation and publication of 
other international agreements is done according to law.”39 
Treaties ratified by a law should be published in the Official 
Gazette.  By extension, one could argue that a treaty cannot 
become domestically binding unless it is published in the 
Official Gazette.   
What happens, then, to a treaty that, according to the 
Constitution, does not have to be ratified by a law of the 
Parliament?  The Constitution, as noted above, determines that 
this remains to be concretized by the law governing the making 
of treaties.  As a result, LMITAA does not contain any pro-
vision about the publication of treaties. Given the gap in 
LMITAA, it would seem plausible to suggest that treaties that 
do not have to be ratified through a law are not published 
                                                          
36 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF 
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 3.  
37 Id.   
38 The Bosnian Constitution, as an example, allows the federal units to 
enter into international treaties if the approval of the central institutions is 
taken.  See generally Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on 
Responsibilities for the Conclusion and Implementation of International 
Agreements under the Constitution of Bosnia And Herzegovina, Doc. No. CDL-
INF(1999)009 (June 21, 1999). 
39 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.117(4). 
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anywhere.40 A broad interpretation of Article 122 of the 
Constitution, however, reveals that each treaty must be 
published prior to becoming binding. Article 122 suggests that 
in order to become binding, even treaties that do not need 
parliamentarian ratification also must be published.41 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDER 
As indicated above, the ways in which international 
treaties become incorporated into the domestic legal structure 
are complex and often confusing.  Still, the question of the 
relationship between treaties and national law remains at the 
heart of domestic constitutional order.  While the discussion 
thus far has proven how interesting this topic can be, 
theoretically, it also retains importance with regard to the 
actual practice of Albanian law.  The case law of the Albanian 
Constitutional Court proves to be compelling because it 
provides a means of bridging the gap between theory and 
practice. 
Thus, three questions remain unanswered, namely: 1) Are 
treaties and domestic law part of a single legal order, or do 
they belong to two independent orders?; 2) If they do form a 
single order, do treaties become automatically incorporated 
into the domestic legal system upon ratification?  If so, can a 
legal or natural citizen rely directly on the any right or 
obligation deriving from the treaty?  Does this lead to direct-
applicability and/or direct-effect?; and 3) If treaties become 
automatically incorporated into the domestic order upon 
ratification, what then is the relationship between those 
treaties and any other laws within the domestic legal order?42  
Do the ratified treaties take higher precedence, or are they 
                                                          
40 Some constitutions, such as Russia’s Constitution, do not explicitly 
require the publication of ratified treaties, which can lead to contesting of 
legal certainty. See Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution 
and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT’L L.  451 (1994). 
41 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 122. 
42 See generally Ige F. Dekker & Ramses A. Wessel, Governance by 
International Organizations: Rethinking the Normative Force of International 
Decisions, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 215–23 (G. W. 
Werner ed., 2004).  
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
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internally constructed and passed as predominately domestic 
laws?  To explain these questions, we must broadly review the 
Albanian constitutional spirit and provisions and then turn to 
the accompanying literature.  
Before addressing these questions, however, it is worth 
noting that Article 5 of the Constitution of Albania establishes: 
“The Republic of Albania applies international law that is 
binding upon it.”43  Although Article 5 does not directly treat 
the status of international law in the domestic legal order, its 
importance cannot be ignored.  It obliges the polity to apply 
binding international law. Article 5, nevertheless, does not 
regulate the manner in which the law is enacted. Instead, it 
institutes the obligation to apply binding international law.  
Article 5, then, makes the polity liable for those elements of 
international law that should be implemented domestically and 
those that must be put into practice internationally through 
interacting with international actors. 
In light of the scope of Article 5, we can begin to address 
the question of whether treaties and Albanian domestic law 
form a single or two independent legal orders.  Article 116 of 
the Constitution of Albania is instructive.  It states that 
“normative acts that are effective in the entire territory of the 
Republic of Albania are: a) the Constitution; b) ratified 
international agreements; c) the laws; [and] d) normative acts 
of the Council of Ministers.”44  In other words, international 
treaties are legally effective within Albanian territory and, 
therefore, make ratified treaties part of the domestic legal 
order.  By its language, Article 116 suggests that there is 
established in Albania a monist system that unites 
international treaties and the domestic legal order.  
Furthermore, this view is clarified by Article 122(1), which 
asserts: 
 Any international agreement that has been ratified constitutes 
part of the internal juridical system after it is published in the 
Official Journal of the Republic of Albania. It is implemented 
directly, except for cases when it is not self-executing and its 
implementation requires issuance of a law. The amendment, 
                                                          
43 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 5. 
44 Id. art. 116. 
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supplementing and repeal of laws approved by the majority of all 
members of the Assembly, for the effect of ratifying an 
international agreement, is done with the same majority.45 
Article 122(1) begins to provide solutions to the issues 
brought up in this article.  It complements Article 116 and 
clarifies the fact that international agreements become part of 
the domestic legal order upon ratification, furthering the 
impression that a monist system prevails and the doctrine of 
incorporation applies.46  In sum, the ratified treaty ex proprio 
vigore becomes part of the Albanian domestic legal order.  
Consequently, given the expressis verbis constitutional 
determination, a ratified treaty, through its own power, 
penetrates the Albanian domestic legal order without 
necessitating any additional domestic legislative action.47  
Having addressed this question, we can now turn to the issue 
of direct applicability and direct effect.  
Does Article 122(1) provide some clarity in regards to the 
direct applicability and direct effect of international treaties?   
It does by claiming that ratified treaties that have been 
published in the official gazette are directly applicable.48  The 
result is that no legal act need be issued to make a treaty 
enforceable; it is directly integrated in the domestic legal order 
and can be directly employed49 by all legal and natural persons 
explicitly, an outcome which also stands in harmony with 
Article 26 of LMITAA.50 
The only exception to the direct applicability of treaties 
established by Article 122(1) arises in a situation in which a 
                                                          
45 Id. art.122(1). 
46 Most of the world’s constitutions incorporate treaties into the domestic 
legal order. See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward 
Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions, 88 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 427, 431 (1994). 
47 See the analogous case of Bulgaria. HristoDanov, Bulgaria, in Eur. 
Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitutional Courts and European 
Integration, 19, Doc. No. CDL-STD(2002)036 (Sept. 19, 2002) [hereinafter 
Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitutional Courts]. 
48 Most European countries apply the principle of direct applicability of 
treaties in the domestic legal order. SeeStein,supra note 43, at 431. 
49 Constantin Economides, The Elaboration of Model Clauses on the 
Relationship Between International and Domestic Law, in Eur. Comm’n. for 
Democracy Through Law, International and Domestic Law, supra note 2. 
50 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF 
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 26.  
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
  
106 PACE INT’L LAW REV. [Vol. XXIV:1 
treaty is not self-executing, or where a law to concretize the 
treaty is required.51  Non-self-executing treaties cause many 
sensitive issues, but since the Albanian Constitution does not 
make clear when a treaty is considered self-executing, a legal 
or natural person cannot rely directly on a treaty in 
determining if it is directly applicable,52 especially since most 
treaties do not advertise their own self-executing nature.53  
Consequently, it is left to the local courts’ jurisdiction to decide 
whether, by the standards of Article 122(1), a treaty is self-
executing.54  The local court can deem a treaty as not directly 
applicable and, thus, refuse to apply it without having specific 
national legislation on the books, which, in turn, can lead to 
legal uncertainty.55 
 Some constitutions, such as that of South Africa, oblige 
domestic courts, inter alia, to interpret the question of the self-
execution of treaties in line with international legal 
standards.56  This kind of provision lessens the risk of refusing 
to apply an international treaty when it is not considered self-
executing domestically and if no domestic legislation to 
concretize it has been issued.  
Moreover, the third problem that this article raises is the 
position that ratified treaties hold within the domestic legal 
hierarchy.  In principle, allowing treaties to be incorporated 
into the domestic legal order on the basis of parity with laws 
would lead to many conflicts and challenges.57  Hence, the 
                                                          
51 Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of 
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 159, 162 (1993) (making this broad argument in reference to the US 
experience). 
52 This argument is based on the debate developed in Danilenko, supra 
note 40, at 465. 
53 Benvenisti, supra note 51, at 162. 
54 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.122(1). 
55 United States courts, for instance, show a tendency to refuse to 
consider treaties self-executing, thus refusing to apply them unless domestic 
legislation concretizing the treaty is passed.  See Benvenisti, supra note 51, 
at 162.  For the South African experience in this regard, see John Dugard, 
International Law and the South African Constitution, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 77, 
83 (1997). 
56 Dugard, supra note 55, at 84. 
57 Vladen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the 
Relationship Between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
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Albanian Constitution allows no room for such challenges.  
First, Article 116, which establishes that treaties exist 
alongside the Constitution and laws,58 and Article 122(2), 
which establishes that “[a]n international agreement that has 
been ratified by law has superiority over laws of the country 
that are not compatible with it,”59 resolve the issue of how 
treaties become incorporated into domestic law.   
Additionally, the phrasing of Article 116 leads to the 
conclusion that treaties ratified by parliamentarian law (as 
opposed to treaties that need no parliamentarian ratification) 
stand below the Constitution in stature, but above individual 
laws.60 Though this hierarchy cannot be taken as a safe basis 
for arguing the position of treaties over one another, one cannot 
dismiss Article 116, as Article 122(2) clarifies by unequivocally 
confirming that treaties ratified by law prevail over any laws 
not compatible with them.61 
In assessing Article 122(2), one can argue two points: 1) 
that it only ranks treaties that are ratified by a law—i.e. those 
that need to be ratified by Parliament—within the fields 
specified in Article 121(1);62 and 2) that it makes treaties 
prevail over laws that are inconsistent with them without 
specifying whether or not this includes only the laws issued 
prior to the ratification of the treaty or those passed 
subsequently as well.  In sum, Article 122(2) ranks treaties 
that have been ratified by a law of the Parliament over 
inconsistent laws,63 but simultaneously sets treaties that are 
considered ratified by the signature of the President of the 
Republic of Albania on the same level with the laws of the 
country.  As a result, the case law of ordinary courts of Albania 
                                                                                                                                  
29, 37 (1996). 
58 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËRISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 116. 
59 Id. art.122(2). 
60 Some jurisdictions set treaties over inconsistent laws by establishing 
the lex posterior derogat priori rule. This only rules out inconsistent laws at 
the time of ratification of the treaty; however, it does not rule out subsequent 
laws.See Economides, supra note 49. 
61 Most constitutions, however, admit this. Id. 
62 The Estonian Constitution, for instance, asserts that all treaties 
prevail over laws. See Uno Löhmus, Estonia, inEur. Comm’n. for Democracy 
Through Law, Constitutional Courts, supra note 47, at 35. 
63 La Pergola, supra note 2. 
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proves that Albanian courts have accepted the idea of treaties 
prevailing over laws.64 
The last issue that remains is the question of the place of 
international organizations’ norms within the Albanian 
domestic legal order.  Article 122(3) of the Constitution 
addresses this issue by stating: “[t]he norms issued by an 
international organization have superiority, in case of conflict, 
over the laws of the country if the agreement ratified by the 
Republic of Albania for its participation in the organization 
expressly contemplates their direct applicability.”65 
Article 122(3), therefore, mandates that the norms of 
international organizations in which Albania is a party—
assuming that the treaty of accession provides for the direct 
applicability of the norms concerned—have superiority over 
internal laws.66  In this context, the norms issued by 
international organizations stand equal to international 
treaties ratified by a parliamentarian law.  Moreover, the term 
“norm” unreservedly refers to a judicial decision by an 
international judicial body.  Admittedly, Article 122(3) eases 
the integration in a supranational organization, whose 
communitarian norms must have prevalence over the laws of 
the member state.  With this in mind, Article 122(3) leaves the 
gate open for the option of joining a supranational institution, 
like the European Union, without the constitutional 
implications allowing primacy of the European Communities’ 
law.  
At the same time, Article 123 establishes, “The Republic of 
Albania, on the basis of international agreements, delegates to 
international organizations state powers for specific issues.”67 
The Assembly may decide that the ratification of such an 
                                                          
64 Gjykata e Lartë [Supreme Court] Sept. 27, 2002, 3 FLETORJA ZYRTARE 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1649; Gjykata e Lartë [Supreme Court] Oct. 5, 2002, 5 
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1769. 
65 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.122(3). 
66 Many constitutions, such as that of Slovakia, do not regulate the issue 
of international organizations’ norms in the face of domestic law. Eur. 
Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, Draft Comparative Study, supra note 
14.   
67 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.123(1). 
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agreement be done through a referendum.”68  As such, Article 
123 authorizes the polity to transfer parts of the country’s 
sovereignty to an international organization, an act that must 
be accomplished through an international treaty.   
The transfer of state powers to international organizations, 
according to the Statute of Rome case heard in Albanian 
Constitutional Court,69 cannot undermine the country’s 
constitutional identity,70 meaning that permission to delegate 
state powers to an international organization is limited to the 
extent that it does not deform the constitutional and sovereign 
identity of the Albanian polity.  Building upon this provision, 
the Constitutional Court has argued that Albania enters into 
international agreements only as a sovereign party,71 thus 
supplementing Article 123.   It is important to note that the 
issue of delegating sovereignty may not, in light of the Statute 
of Rome case, limit the sovereign character of the polity or its 
ability to enter into treaties because delegation of sovereignty 
to international organizations may not be imposed externally.   
Still, the delegation of sovereignty for purposes of modern 
integration is an approach that has been de facto acknowledged 
by the Albanian constitutional justice.72  On the other hand, 
Article 123 of the Constitution lets us contend that, though the 
transfer of powers to an international organization is 
permitted, the power transferred does automatically prevent 
the Albanian polity from issuing norms for the transferred 
power.  Overall, Article 123 makes it possible for the polity to 
enter into international treaties that contain the duty to 
                                                          
68 Id. art.123(3). 
69 See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Draft Report on Case-
Law Regarding The Supremacy Of International Human Rights Treaties, 4–5, 
Doc. No. CDL-DI(2004)005 (Oct. 22, 2004). 
70 The French Constitutional Council, while reviewing the constitu-
tionality of the Statute of Rome, found that the case conflicts with the 
Constitution (contrary to how the Albanian Constitutional Court ruled); 
hence, the Constitutional Council of France ruled that the Constitution must 
be amended.  See, Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Draft Report on 
the Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute, Doc. 
No. CDL-AD(2008)031 (Oct. 10, 2008). 
71 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Sept. 23, 2002, 32 
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delegatesovereign powers to an international organization,73 
which coincides with the needs of current trends in global 
integration.74 
THE ISSUE OF TREATIES’ CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
AND LEGAL CONSISTENCY WITH PREVAILING TREATIES 
Following Article 122(1) of the Constitution of Albania, it 
seems clear that international treaties take precedence over 
Albanian laws, but that treaties must still be subordinate to 
the Constitution.75  This notion raises important questions 
regarding the existence of mechanisms that review the 
constitutionality of treaties, since they must be constitutional.76  
This rule is also complicated by the fact that, while treaties 
remain subordinate to the Constitution, Article 122(1) makes it 
clear that treaties prevail over the laws of the country, which 
leaves the need for a mechanism that can assure that laws 
inconsistent with treaties are avoided.   
This part of the article, therefore, addresses two matters: 
1) the issue of the constitutional review of treaties; and 2) the 
issue of assuring the precedence of treaties over inconsistent 
laws.  In principle, one could argue that several mechanisms 
exist that can assure the consistency between treaties and 
                                                          
73 For the requirement of the Venice Commission in this regard, see Eur. 
Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, 
Doc. No. CDL-AD(2007)004 (Mar. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n for 
Democracy Through Law, Constitution of Serbia]. 
74 Louis Lopez Guerra, Concluding Report, in Eur. Comm’n for 
Democracy Through Law, European Integration and Constitutional Law, Doc. 
No. CDL-STD(2000)030 (Sept. 30, 2000). The Constitution of Turkey, for 
instance, does not allow the transfer of sovereignty.  See, Christian Rumph, 
Turkish Constitutional Law and the European Union from a European Point 
of View, in Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitutional 
Implications of Accession to the European Union, Doc. No. CDL-STD(2002)03 
(Nov. 10, 2001). 
75 We use here the term “treaty” as a treaty ratified by law in light of Art. 
122(1) of the Constitution of Albania, thus leaving aside treaties that need no 
parliamentarian ratification, given that in the latter case, treaties 
presumably have the rank of laws. 
76 The Croatian Constitution, for instance, assigns no power to the 
Constitutional Court to check the constitutionality of treaties.  See, Eur. 
Comm’n. for Democracy Through Law, The Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia and International Law, Doc. No. CDL(96)34 (May 29, 
1996) (by S. Rodin). 
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domestic legislation.  These consist of an a priori control of the 
constitutionality of treaties, an incorporation of a clause into 
the laws that establishes that the law will be applied only if it 
is in harmony with binding treaties, an interpretation of laws 
in the spirit of treaties so that they remain consistent with 
treaties and their targets, and an a posteriori control of the 
constitutionality of treaties alongside an a priori control of the 
consistency of the draft-laws with binding international 
treaties.77 
As far as the first question is concerned, the Constitution 
of Albania authorizes the Constitutional Court to decide 
questions of “compatibility of international agreements with 
the Constitution, prior to their ratification.”78  In such cases, 
the procedure before the Constitutional Court can be initiated 
only by one of the following: “a) the President of the Republic; 
b) the Prime Minister; c) no less than one-fifth of the deputies; 
f) the People’s Advocate; g) organs of the local government; h) 
organs of religious communities; [or] i) political parties and 
other organizations.”79  If the Constitutional Court decides to 
bring the case in a plenary session, then the ratification 
procedure is immediately suspended.80  After that, the Court is 
obliged to reach a decision within a month, but if the treaty is 
considered unconstitutional, its ratification is prohibited.81 
As observed above, the review of constitutionality of 
international treaties rests with the Constitutional Court.82  
Still, the Parliament, the President, and the government can 
review the constitutionality of a treaty during the treaty-
                                                          
77 Economides, supra note 49. 
78 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 131. 
79 Id. art.134; LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA [LOFCCA] Feb. 10, 
2000, art. 52.  
80 LOFCCA art. 52.   
81 Id. The Estonian Constitution, for instance, prohibits the polity from 
entering into treaties that conflict with the Constitution; this prohibition is 
another mode of upholding the supremacy of the Constitution vis-à-vis 
treaties.  See Löhmus, supra note 62, at 39. 
82 Though the Constitution prevails over laws, one should not aim at 
interpreting the Constitution against international law.  For the suggestions 
of the Venice Commission, see Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, 
Constitution of Serbia, supra note 73. 
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making and ratification process—independent of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction—and make it comply with 
the constitution of the polity. In view of that, there is evidence 
that shows that the Parliament itself has been involved in 
ruling out laws that contradict international treaties.83 
The power of the Constitutional Court to control the 
constitutionality of a treaty, however, is limited.  As observed 
above, the Albanian Constitutional Court only has preventive 
jurisdiction over the constitutionality of treaties,84 which 
means it cannot call a treaty unconstitutional after the 
ratification instrument has been provided on behalf of the 
Republic of Albania.  The power to exercise preventive control 
over the constitutionality of a treaty, as a result, assures that 
an international obligation is constitutionally reviewed prior to 
ratification, and that, when ratified, it cannot be banned 
anymore.85  The preemptive constitutional review of treaties, as 
such, contributes to legal certainty—as opposed to repressive 
constitutional control.86 
On the other hand, one can observe that the number of 
actors that can raise the issue of the constitutionality of a 
treaty before the Constitutional Court is pretty broad, with 
only individuals barred from raising the question. Overall, it is 
possible to review treaties’ constitutionality under the auspices 
of the Constitution of Albania within the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction, but yet the Parliament, the President of the 
Republic, and the government can control the constitutionality 
of treaties in the treaty-making and ratification phase as well.   
In exceptional cases, the Constitutional Court can still use 
the prerogative of annulling an international treaty a 
posteriori87 by declaring unconstitutional the law used to ratify 
                                                          
83 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Sept. 23, 2002, 32 
FLETORJA ZYRTARE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] 1299. 
84 For more about the suggestion to establish only a priori constitutional 
review of treaties, see Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, 
Constitution of Serbia, supra note 73. 
85 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art. 131; cf. Eur. Comm’n for Democracy 
Through Law, Constitution of Serbia, supra note 73. 
86 See Tomasz Dybowski, The Role of the Constitutional Tribunal in the 
Interpretation of International Law in Poland, in Eur. Comm’n for Democracy 
Through Law, International and Domestic Law, supra note 2.  
87 Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitution of Serbia, 
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the treaty under the jurisdiction of controlling the 
constitutionality of laws themselves.88  This step, however, 
would constitute a breach of Article 46 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties89 and could be seen as 
judicially arbitrary and a misuse of power by the court.  Such 
action would only invalidate the treaty obligation domestically, 
though it would not discharge the international liability of the 
state for the application of that treaty.90 
As noted above, the second issue begs the question of 
consistency between laws and treaties or, more particularly, 
whether or not the Albanian constitutional system assures that 
laws contradicting treaties are ruled out from the domestic 
legal order.  This question is directly linked to the prescription 
of Article 122(1), which asserts that treaties prevail over 
inconsistent laws.91  As such, Article 131 of the Constitution 
allows the Constitutional Court of Albania, inter alia, to rule on 
the: “a) compatibility of the law with the Constitution or with 
international agreements as provided in article 122; and b) 
compatibility of normative acts of the central and local organs 
with the Constitution and international agreements.”92  The 
right to initiate control over the consistency of a law with an 
internationally binding treaty belongs to the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister, at least one-fifth of the deputies 
of Parliament, the Chairman of the High State Audit, the 
People’s Advocate, local authorities, religious institutions, 
political parties, and other organizations.93 
To this extent, one could argue that, in light of Article 131, 
the Constitutional Court is vested with a posteriori jurisdiction 
to rule out laws and other normative acts that contradict any 
international treaty binding in Albania.  This provision further 
empowers the standing of treaties over laws as laid out in 
                                                                                                                                  
supra note 73.  
88 See Danilenko, supra note 40; see also Balkin, supra note 8. 
89 See Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Constitution of Serbia, 
supra note 73. 
90 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A 
Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310 (2003); see also Guerra, supra note 74. 
91 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.122(1). 
92 Id. art. 131. 
93 LAW ON THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA [LOFCCA] Feb. 10, 2000, art. 49. 
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Article 122(1) by providing the mechanism to ensure that 
domestic laws incompatible with treaties are ruled out.  At the 
same time, the number of actors authorized to initiate the 
procedure for controlling the consistency of laws with an 
international treaty is very broad, leading to the conclusion 
that the process of seeking to address questions of consistency 
is rather open from a constitutional justice point of view.  
Within the Constitution of Albania, however, there is an 
exception to the principle of preventive control of 
constitutionality of treaties.  Article 180 of the Albanian 
Constitution—adopted in 1998—establishes that treaties 
ratified prior to its adoption remain in force, but vests the 
Council of Ministers with the power to bring before the 
Constitutional Court treaties ratified before 1998 and in 
conflict with the new Constitution.94  As a result, the 
Constitutional Court can ban treaties ratified before 1998 with 
an a posteriori jurisdiction if it finds them unconstitutional.95  
This exception is the only one provided for, however, in terms 
of the review of a treaty’s constitutionality after its ratification.  
Still, the solution found in Article 180 puts treaties ratified 
prior to 1998 into conformity with the new constitutional order 
and its supremacy, which is logically acceptable. 
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA AND THE GOOD FAITH 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda and the application, 
in good faith, of binding treaties remain essential to the 
concern over the relationship between international law and 
national law. In the first instance, it is worth noting that the 
Constitution of Albania provides for neither specific nor 
general provisions that might explicitly constitute the 
responsibility to the pacta sunt servanda principle and 
application in good faith of international treaties.  The only 
relevant constitutional provision that might apply is Article 5, 
which prescribes that the Republic of Albania must apply 
binding international law.96  With this in mind, the relevance of 
                                                          
94 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËS SE SHQIPËISË [CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA] Oct. 21, 1998, art.180(2). 
95 Id. art.180. 
96 Id. art. 5. 
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these principles should be investigated in light of constitutional 
justice and the case law of the Constitutional Court, while 
paying attention to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.97 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the pacta sunt servanda principle is binding over all 
of its signatories.98  Article 27 flatly states that states cannot 
invoke domestic legal actions to invalidate an international 
obligation as stipulated in a treaty.99  An exception to Article 
27 of the Vienna Convention does appear in Article 46, which 
allows states to invoke national rules that invalidate the 
instrument of ratification of an international treaty, but only if 
the rule concerned is of crucial importance to the domestic legal 
order.100  The other customary exception, the principle of rebus 
sic stantibus, allows states to invalidate international 
obligations if circumstances change and the meaning of those 
international obligations have lost their rationale.101  In 
principle, though pacta sunt servanda and application in good 
faith of treaties are interrelated, the former highlights the 
state’s international responsibility, whereas the latter shows 
the domestic accountability in the application of a treaty.  
Simply put, however, the two should be understood as two 
prongs of the same issue: that is, a state’s responsibility to 
apply international obligations. 
To begin with, since the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties is part of the domestic legal order of Albania,102 one 
could argue that the pacta sunt servanda principle is already a 
domestic legal obligation.  Additionally, LMITAA obliges every 
institution to observe the application of treaties and to report 
on the vitality of their application.103  Though the law does not 
                                                          
97 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY 71–72 (2008). 
98 Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 26. 
99 Id. art. 27; see Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Law and 
Foreign Policy, Doc. No. CDL-STD(1997)024 (Sept. 27, 1997). 
100 Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 46. 
101 Id. 
102 See Republika e Shqipërisë [Republic of Albania], MINISTRA E 
PUNËVËTË JASHTME [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS], http://www.mfa.gov.al/ 
index.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
103 THE LAW ON MAKING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF 
ALBANIA [LMITAA] art. 4.  
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impose any further obligation, one could question whether or 
not any other constitutional provision applies the pacta 
suntservanda principle.   
The Albanian Constitution, for one, has no further 
mechanism to uphold pacta sunt servanda.  Besides, it does not 
comment, for instance, on whether or not the Constitutional 
Court may label as unconstitutional acts that invalidate 
international obligations.104  In light of Article 121(4) of the 
Constitution and Article 27 of LMITAA, it seems that any 
denunciation of international treaties can be undertaken 
without explicit prohibition, though the Albanian 
Constitutional Court has argued that domestic measures 
cannot prevent the country to comply with international law,105 
adding that there is no mechanism to prevent the polity from 
instituting domestic legal measures that denounce an 
international treaty of which Albania is a party.106 
The only references to such an occurrence, then, remain in 
the Vienna Convention, which—given that Albania is a party to 
it—comprises part of the domestic legal order.  Of course, this 
argument leads to the problem that the legal provisions that 
allow the denunciation of international treaties provided by 
LMITAA in Article 27 contradict the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which means that the only logical conclusion 
is that the Vienna Convention provisions constitute part of the 
domestic Albanian law and, thus, prevail over the provisions of 
LMITAA.   
Additionally, the Constitution prevails over the Vienna 
Convention on the domestic front and does not provide the 
means for any denunciation, but only refers to LMITAA, which 
must regulate it. Ultimately, then, the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda and the applicationin good faith of international 
treaties can be considered domestic principles only in light of 
the penetration of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties into the Albanian domestic legal order, since the 
Constitution provides no particular insight into this issue. The 
                                                          
104 KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKËSSË KOSOVËS [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF KOSOVO] June 15, 2008, art. 114(3)–(4). 
105 Gjykatës Kushtetuese [Constitutional Court] Sept. 23, 2002, 32 
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lack of repressive jurisdiction to control the constitutionality of 
treaties, however, does signify an implicit acceptance of Article 
27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by the 
Constitution of Albania. 
CONCLUSION 
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between 
treaties and the Albanian domestic legal order.  While the 
article approaches the issue mainly from a constitutional law 
perspective, it also addresses international law.  Using existing 
scholarship and specific case studies, the article’s findings 
reveal themselves to be both tangible and convincing.  They 
help expose the complicated situations created by the 
intricacies of Albanian law and, by broadly interpreting current 
legal frameworks, seek to produce logically and legally correct 
conclusions. 
Overall, this article addressed five main questions:   
As to the first question—of the power to negotiate and 
formulate a treaty—it is clear that authority rests in the hands 
of the Albanian Council of Ministers and the President of the 
Republic, who has the power to sign treaties.  Through a 
legally-logical argument, the article concludes that the 
negotiation, formulation, and signing of treaties—which 
constitute the treaty-making powers in narrow terms—cannot 
be conducted without the permission of the President of 
Republic, though the Council of Ministers can engage in 
negotiating, formulating, and signing activities.  The Albanian 
Constitutional Court welcomes the same conclusion based on 
the case of Socialist Party v. Council of Ministers.  On the other 
hand, the ratification of treaties rests with the Albanian 
Parliament, though its power is limited to certain specified 
legal fields.  If a given treaty falls outside the fields mentioned 
in the Constitution, the treaty can be considered ratified after 
being signed by the President of Republic. 
As to the second question—of the relationship between 
treaties and the domestic legal order—this article concludes 
that Albanian constitutional law provides for a monist model of 
the relationship between international treaties and national 
law.   International treaties, upon ratification, become ex prop-
rio vigore, part of the domestic legal order and directly 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/3
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applicable.  As a result, treaties ratified by law take precedence 
over inconsistent laws.  
As to the third question—of the constitutional review of 
treaties and the review of the consistency between laws and 
international treaties—it appears that the Albanian 
Constitutional Court is vested with the power to check a priori 
the constitutionality of treaties and a posteriori the consistency 
of laws with prevailing international treaties.  This job can be 
unreservedly exercised by the Parliament as well.  
As to the fourth question—of whether constitutional law 
and the law of treaties provide for any mechanism that would 
uphold the principle of pacta sunt servanda domestically—this 
article concludes that the Constitution and relevant laws 
barely address this issue.  Hence, only the penetration of the 
ratified Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can be 
considered as a source for explaining this phenomenon.  
Finally, the article ends with the assertion that the 
relationship between treaties and domestic law in the case of 
Albania is to a certain extent modern, even if its regulation is 
not entirely clear.  The findings of the article, as a result, can 
help facilitate Albanian constitutional justice to address the 
issue of the rapport between international treaties and the 
domestic legal order in a theoretically informed and inclusive 
manner.
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